TRADE ACT OF 1974- COUNTERVAILING DUTIEs-NONEXCESSIVE REMISSION OF FOREIGN EXCISE TAX ON PRODUCTS IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A BOUNTY OR GRANT REQUIRING THE LEVY OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

In 1970, plaintiff Zenith, a domestic producer of electronic equipment,
petitioned' the Commissioner of Customs,2 alleging that Japan was bestowing bounties or grants upon the export of certain electronic products,
to the United States; therefore, such imported products had to be subject
to a countervailing duty under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended by the Trade Act of 1974 (section 303).1 Plaintiff's allegation was
based solely upon the Japanese Commodity Tax Law5 which applied an
After the Secretary of the Treasury has made a determination that a bounty or grant has
not been bestowed, an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of merchandise of the
"same kind or class" as reviewed by the Secretary has thirty days to file written notice of
intent to contest the determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (Supp. V 1975).
See Kaye & Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to
Section 337 Jurisdictionof the US. InternationalTrade Commission, 2 INT'L TR.A L. J. 1,
27-29 (1977) for an explanation of the procedure for instituting a countervailing duty investigation. Although the countervailing duty statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975) imposes
the burden of making countervailing duty determinations upon the Secretary of the Treasury,
regulations require that the petition be sent to the Commissioner of Customs who then
institutes the investigation. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b)(c) (1977).
The products included primarily television, radio, and phonograph components. See
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d at 1211 n. 2.
1 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V. 1975) § 1303 Countervailing Duties
(a) Levy of Countervailing Duties
(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political
subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation,
shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision
of government, then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the
United States, whether the same shall be imported directly from the country of
production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in
the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been
changed in condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid,
in all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the
net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
Sh~h5 (Commodity Tax Law) (Law No. 48, as revised March 31, 1962). The Japanese
Commodity Tax is considered a transfer tax, which is levied upon manufacturers, importers,
or retailers on the sale of eighteen types of merchandise. Exported goods are exempt. These
articles are divided into three classes each of which fixes the tax base and determines whether
the manufacturer, importer, or retailer pays it. This suit involved items in the second classification, which also includes motor vehicles, sporting goods, fueled appliances, television and
sound appliances, musical instruments and parts, photographic equipment, furniture, clocks
and watches, smoking paraphenalia, luggage, toiletries, and soft drinks. Retailers of these
class two products have one month following the month of the sale of the goods to file a return.
The base of the tax is the manufacturer's selling price and is paid by the manufacturer. Tax
rates range from 5% for radio accessories to 10% for radios to 15% for phonographs to 20% for
televisions and their component parts.
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excise tax on domestic, but not export, sales of electronic products.' The
Commissioner of Customs, with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, ruled that a nonexcessive remission of excise taxes on exported merchandise did not constitute the bestowal of bounties or grants
under section 303.1 Plaintiff then sought judicial review of the Commissioner's determination in the United States Customs Court., On a motion
for summary judgment, plaintiff argued as a matter of law that any remission of domestic excise taxes upon exportation conferred a bounty or grant
which must be countervailed. In its cross-motion for summary judgment,
defendant contended that both the legislative history and the 75 years of
administrative practice 9 in applying section 303 required that a remission
of excise taxes must be excessive before a countervailing duty could be
imposed."6 The three judge Customs Court" unanimously granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the remission of the
Japanese excise tax on electronic products exported from Japan constituted a bounty or grant within the meaning of section 303 as a matter of
I "Remission" denotes both tax exemption and tax refund, which the CCPA found to
be legally indistinct. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d at 1211 n.4 (1977).
1 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
Prior to its amendment, section 303 stated that once the Secretary of the Treasury determined that a bounty or grant was being bestowed, he had no discretion but was required to
impose a countervailing duty. Also, there was no time period within which the Secretary had
to act. V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 28 C.C.P.A. 249 (1940) and Robert
E. Miller & Co. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. 101 (1947). Under section 303, as amended,
the Secretary must make a preliminary determination within six months of the filing of a
complaint and a final determination within one year from the filing of the petition. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a)(4)(Supp. V 1975).
The Trade Act of 1974 authorized the United States Customs Court to review a negative
countervailing duty determination made by the Secretary of the Treasury at the request of
American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers. Although importers have always had the
right to judicial review of countervailing duty assessments imposed by the Treasury, judicial
review of negative countervailing duty determinations was not sought by manufacturers,
producers, or wholesalers before 1971.
In United States v. Hammond Lead, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
reversing Hammond Lead, Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 460 (1969) the Court held that
countervailing duties are a penal exaction, which Congress did not intend for the courts to
impose merely because of the protest of an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler.
The decision was reversed in effect when Congress amended the 1974 Trade Act which authorized such petitions as the present one, the first of its kind. Also, countervailing duties are
now to be considered remedial, not penal. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1974).
Actually the Treasury practice dates from 1897 and thus has continued for 80 years.
,' See, e.g., T.D. 43634, 56 TREAs. DEC. INT. REV. 342 (1929) and T.D. 49355, 73 TREAs. DEC.
INT. REV. 107 (1938).
1 Under § 108 of the Customs Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 255 (1970) a three judge panel was
convened. A three judge trial is permissible upon the petition of any party to a civil action
before the Customs Court or at the direction of the Chief Justice of that court whenever a
case raises an issue of (1) the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, a proclamation of the
President or an executive order, or (2) has broad or significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws. Decisions need not be unanimous.
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law.' 2 On appeal by defendant to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, in a 3-2 decision, held, reversed. Under section 303 a
remission of Japanese domestic excise taxes on merchandise exported to
the United States does not confer a bounty or grant authorizing the levy
of countervailing duties upon the exporting industry. United States v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3511 (1978).
While the congressional13 power to levy countervailing duties on imports
stems from the Constitution, 4 this power was not exercised until the Tariff
Act of 1890,'5 which provided for the imposition of such duties on sugar
imports only. The Tariff Act of 1894,1 which was also restricted to sugar
imports, expressly disallowed countervailing duties where the bounty or
grant conferred by the exporting nation took the form of a nonexcessive tax
remission. Section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897, the basis of the present
section 303, first provided for the imposition of countervailing duties on
imports other than sugar." This section, also eliminated the 1894 Act's
exemption for nonexcessive tax remissions and instead mandated a countervailing duty equal to the "net amount of such bounty or grant."' 8 Al" Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (1977) (both concurring justices
filed separate opinions.).
'1 Imposing customs duties is essentially a legislative act. Nonetheless it has been expressly
held that the President or the Secretary of the Treasury may be deemed the agent of Congress
to determine the circumstances under which duties will be imposed. Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
11 Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. The authority to impose duties on imports and the prohibition against duties on exports applies exclusively to foreign trade. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1.
" See Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 583, providing for an additional duty on imported sugar
from a country "which paid a higher bounty on exportation of sugar than upon unprocessed
sugars with less saccharin." Spurred by increased competition from the German cane industry which was partially subsidized by that foreign government, the Congress passed the Tariff
Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 521 which imposed duties upon sugar imports from any country which
granted bounties to that industry.
"
28 Stat. 521.
'7 30 Stat. Section 5 of the 1897 Tariff Act provided:
whenever any country . . .shall pay or bestow . . . any bounty or grant upon
the exportation of any article or merchandise from such country . . .and such
article or merchandise is dutiable . . . there shall be levied and paid . . . an
additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant ....
Compare section 5 with 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975). The dutiable act under the 1897
legislation was the exportation itself, whereas the modern statute triggers a countervailing
duty if the bounty or grant is conferred upon manufacturing or producing as well as exporting
the article or merchandise.
Under the 1974 Trade Act, nondutiable imports may be subject to a countervailing duty
only if there is a finding of a bounty or grant, and if there is a determination of injury. That
determination of injury, however, is to be made by the International Trade Commission. 19
U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975). See Pub. L. 93-618, Title III, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2049,
and [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & NEws 7186 for a discussion of the relevant legislative history.
11Compare statutes at notes 15-20, infra, with 19 U.S.C. § 1303(1)(a), for that language.
When Congress substituted the "net amount" terminology for the "nonexcessive" language
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though the subsequent Tariff Acts of 1909,11 1913,2 1922,21 and 193022 expanded the application of countervailing duties, they retained the basic
provisions of section 5 without substantial change. The purpose of the
countervailing duty statute was once considered penal23 in character; however, it is now essentially a remedial measure intended to protect United
States industry by offsetting unfair price advantages afforded foreign exporters through government subsidies." Thus, whenever a foreign government25 has given any bounty" or grant" for goods imported into the United
of the 1894 Act, it is not known whether Congress intended for the Treasury to countervail
the full amount of the bounty or grant or only continue to assess the excessive remission. In
the instant case the Customs Court unanimously concluded that the Treasury practice was
in error and has been in error because that court interpreted the congressional amendment
to indicate disagreement with the then Treasury practice. 430 F. Supp. 242, 246 (1977). But
the majority of the CCPA decided that there was nothing in the legislative history of the
disputed statute to support such a proposition. 562 F.2d 1209, 1220 (1977).
' 36 Stat. 11. Section 6 of the 1909 Tariff Act added "province or other political subdivision
of government."
1 38 Stat. 114. This Act allowed countervailing duties upon goods not otherwise dutiable,
where a bounty or grant had been bestowed. See note 17 supra.
21 42 Stat. 858. This Act added manufacturing or producing as well as exporting to the acts
which could trigger a countervailing duty determination. See note 18 supra.
46 Stat. 687.
z See note 8 supra.
, Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S.
34 (1919); and Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (1963).
" The antidumping statute, 19 U.S.C. § 160-171(1970 & Supp. V 1975) and the countervailing duty statute are related conceptually. On the one hand, antidumping measures are designed to protect domestic industries from a foreign company, acting privately, unfairly
selling below cost in the United States market. The countervailing duty statute, on the other
hand, protects domestic industry where a foreign company sells merchandise here more
cheaply as a result of some form of public assistance. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An
Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 17, 33 (1969).
" Generally, a "grant" is more comprehensive in meaning than a "bounty," although many
courts have failed to distinguish the two. United States v. Hill Bros. Co., 107 F. 107 (1901)
and Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919). Bounties or grants may take many
forms. Multiple exchange rate systems can result in bounties or grants. Energetic Worsted
Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (1963). Requiring payment in the more expensive
registered reichsmarks instead of the cheaper free reichsmarks can result in a bounty or grant.
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348, (C.C.P.A. 1940). Payments to silk
exporters by the Italian Government to encourage that industry is a bounty. 39 Op. Avr'v
GEN. 261 (1939). Where Italy refunded Basic Rates Taxes on capital equipment and land
mortgages, exported goods were subject to a countervailing duty. American Express Co. v.
United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (1973).
In a case strikingly similar to the instant one, the CCPA in dicta stated that where an
exporter is relieved from a tax on property which would otherwise be imposed in Japan, the
country of origin, then no bounty or grant has been conferred. United States v. Iwai & Co.,
16 C.C.P.A. 56 (1928).
" The "allowance" of three or five pence authorized by British revenue legislation upon
each gallon of certain exported spirits was a grant within the meaning of § 4 of the Tariff
Act of 1913. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
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States, regardless of its form or purpose,2" the Secretary of the Treasury
must2 impose a countervailing duty equal to the "net amount of such
bounty or grant."30
This 1897 legislative definition of a countervailing duty was accompanied by the administrative precedents of the Tresury Department, which
have construed the mere remission of foreign excise taxes on exported
goods not to be a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of the statute.3'
In order for a countervailing duty to be levied, a remission of a foreign
excise tax must be in excess 32 of the taxes collected on the exported product.
'3
Few judicial decisions deal with tax remissions as a "bounty or grant. 1
4
The leading case is Downs v. United States,1
decided in 1903, which interpreted "net amount of such bounty or grant" under section 5 of the Tariff
Act of 1897.35 Downs dealt with a complicated 3 Russian Government system for controlling the production and price of sugar, through which Russian sugar exporters were relieved of paying the domestic excise tax. Not
only was the tax remitted if the sugar was exported, but the exporter also
received marketable certificates which were transferrable to domestic
manufacturers and refiners; therefore, a domestic producer, who purchased a marketable certificate from an exporter, could sell his sugar in
Russia free of the domestic tax burden, while the exporter could receive a
cash benefit from the domestic seller. The Downs' Court held that the
Russian system for controlling the price and production of sugar was an
indirect "bounty or grant" under section 5.
Whether the Downs' holding was based upon that Court's finding that
the "bounty or grant" consisted of one element-either the tax remission
z The use of the word "bonification" by the German Government in the remission of duties
upon exportation did not change the fact that the industry was receiving a special advantage.
United States v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16 (1898).
" American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
3 The decision of the Secretary of the Treasury as to the actual amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed where the circumstances require a duty is conclusive and not reviewable by the courts. Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (1963); V.
Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, (C.C.P.A. 1940); Franklin Sugar Refining Co.
v. United States, 178 F. 747 (1910) and American Express v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050
(C.C.P.A. 1973). There is a presumption in favor of the Secretary's determination on the issue
of whether or not a bounty has been conferred. V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d
354, (C.C.P.A. 1940) and Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 178 F. 743 (1910).
3 1 Tapas. DEC. 696, T.D. 19321 (1898); 2 Ta&As. DEC. 157, T.D. 19729 (1898); 2 TREAS.
DEc. 996, T.D. 20407 (1898); 26TREAs. DEC. 825, T.D. 34466 (1914); 54 TaEAs. DEC. 101, T.D.
42895 (1928); 56 TEA.s. DEC. 342, T.D. 43634 (1929) and 73 TREAS. DEC. 107, T.D. 49355
(1938).
12 See SENATE COMM. ON FiNANCE 93D CONG., 2D SEss. EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDIES,
11-12 (Comm. Print 1974); Rosendahl, 2 LAw & PoL. INT'L Bus. 85 (1970).
3 See notes 26-28 supra for examples.
-,187 U.S. 496 (1903).
11 "Net amount" was added in 1897. See note 17 supra.
' The scheme is explained fully at 4 TREAs. DEC. 405, 409-13, T.D. 22984 (1901).
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or marketable certificate alone-or two elements-the tax remission together with the marketable certificate-is unclear. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), found 7 that it was the entire scheme in
Downs-the tax remission plus the marketable certificate-that conferred
the "bounty or grant." Since Downs involved a "bounty or grant" composed of two elements whereas the instant case involved only one element-the nonexcessive tax remission-the CCPA was not bound by precedent and could decide this case as an issue of first impression., Because
the Downs holding consisted of broad language,3 it was obiter dicta'
which, when read in light of the facts before the Downs Court, did not
constitute a Supreme Court holding that every nonexcessive excise tax
remission constituted a "bounty or grant" as a matter of law." Even
though subsequent cases had followed Downs' broad language,' 2 the CCPA
did not consider it to be binding authority.'3
The CCPA buttressed its interpretation of Downs by construing the
1 562 F.2d at 1213-14 (1977). As the Customs Court read Downs, the net amount of the
bounty or grant was the full benefit actually conferred upon the exporters. In other words the
Russian sugar exporters received two bounties or grants: the first was remission of the domestic excise tax and the second was the transferable certificate. 430 F. Supp. at 245, 252 and
260 (1977).
562 F.2d at 1213-14 (1977).
" As the CCPA viewed the matter, the Downs Court went too far when it said, "twihen
a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then by
whatever process or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty
upon exportation." 187 U.S. at 515. The CCPA held that the Customs Court erred by relying
upon that broad language since generalities must be construed within the context of the case
in which they arise. 562 F.2d at 1213.
As pointed out in Downs, there were two elements to the bounty. The remission of the excise
tax alone, the first element, was insufficient to trigger the countervailing duty. But, the
transferable certificate, the second element, was excessive and justified the protective duty.
Although, the Downs Court referred to the certificate as an additional bounty, 187 U.S. at
512-13, it appears that the term "bounty" was used for convenience to describe the effect of
any tax remission.
,0See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-Emerging Issue in
InternationalTrade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82 (1968-69); Note, The Michelin Decision: A Possible
New Directionfor U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 237 (1974) and
Feller, note 24 supra.
To the dissent, the "double bounty" interpretation of Downs was fundamental to that
decision and was not obiter dictum. Hence, the instant case could not be one of first impression. 562 F.2d at 1223.
" Since the Treasury refused to apply countervailing duties unless the remitted taxes were
excessive, and since manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers could not file complaints
before 1975, it is not surprising that the Treasury's practice was unchallenged until the
instant case.
,1Broad language unnecessary to the Court's decision is not to be blindly accepted as
binding authority, although it has been quoted in many subsequent cases and even though
the language has been described as stating the principle of the old case. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972).
4 562 F.2d at 1215.
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statutory language in light of the legislative history" and the Treasury's
administrative practice.4 In construing thestatutory language,4" the court
found that the congressional purpose 7 was to equalize the economic result
of a foreign government's subsidy." Because the levying of countervailing
duties is likely to have political and economic ramifications beyond United
States borders,4" Congress refused to define the terms "bounty or grant" 0
and "net amount."'" Therefore, the statute gave the Secretary of the Treasury discretion 2 to decide whether to levy a counterveiling duty after the
" As the Customs Court viewed the legislative history of section 303, Congress had been
informed of the Downs case at the latest by 1908 and had "ratified" it the next year when it
reenacted section 5 of the 1897 Tariff Act without substantial amendment. But it was precisely the meaning of Downs which was the focus of this dispute. If that court was correct in
its "either/or" double bounty interpretation of that turn of the century case then it would
follow that the Treasury's administrative procedure conflicted with the congressionally approved practice and would have to conform because when Congress reenacts statutory language after a judicial ruling there is a presumption that Congress approved of the decision.
Furthermore, as the Customs Court viewed the situation, the Congress refused the defendant's proposed legislation during the 1950's to amend the countervailing duty law to conform
to the administrative practice. The Customs Court also noted that in 1975 when the national
legislature amended the Antidumping Act of 1921 to agree with the countervailing duty law,
neither the House nor the Senate Committees would endorse the Treasury's enforcement of
the disputed law. Again, fundamental to the lower court's logic was the correctness of its
double bounty interpretation of Downs, a conclusion which the CCPA found to be unwarranted.
11Since 1897 the Treasury practice has been not to countervail mere remissions of foreign
excise taxes. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
11See note 4 supra.

Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
'

562 F.2d at 1222.
The language of section 303 "whenever any country

...

shall pay or bestow . . . any

bounty or grant," suggests a factual inquiry into the laws and practices of the foreign country.
If the Secretary of the Treasury imposes a countervailing duty, the amount of the duty is not
subject to judicial review. See note 30 supra. But the question of whether or not a country is
paying or bestowing a bounty or grant where such a determination depends upon the construction of foreign law, is judicially reviewable. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
Judges Boe and Newman in their separate concurring opinions would dismiss the international economic and political reprecussions. For example, Judge Newman said, "the proper
exercise of our judicial function requires that we interpret and apply the law unrestrained by
extra-legal considerations more appropriately addressed to legislative policy." 430 F. Supp
at 250. See United States v. Hammond Lead, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (1971); Butler, supra note
40, at 147-48. See also JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, 90TH CONG., lST SEss. THE
FUTURE OF UNITED STATES TRADE PoucY (Comm. Print 1967).
11 For case law on the terms, see notes 26-28 supra.

3' While the Customs Court conceded that "net amount" as used by the 54th Congress in
tariff measures preceeding the 1897 Tariff Act should have the construction suggested by the
Treasury, measures passed by the 55th Congress, including the Tariff Act of 1897, were
intended to impart greater flexibility to the United States Customs Authority to counter
rapidly changing foreign, particularly German, tax laws. The Tariff Act of 1897 specifically
deleted the provision of the Tariff Act of 1894 which limited the application of the statute
only to excessive tax remissions. 30 CONG. REc. 316, 317, 318, 2204, 2224. See also notes 1522 supra and accompanying text.
52

Unlike the antidumping law there is no requirement of "injury" before a countervailing
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domestic economic impact53 of the foreign government's action had been
assessed by a factual inquiry." Because Congress assigned the Treasury
this factual inquiry55 and because the economic result of the remission of
the Japanese Commodity Tax was not mentioned in the lower court," the
CCPA presumed that the economic result did not confer a benefit requiring
that a remedial duty be imposed.57
Examining the legislative history of section 303, the CCPA found that
subsequent legislation had not ratified the interpretatin of Downs, 5 that
a tax remission alone constituted a countervailable "bounty or grant."
Even though Congress was aware of this interpretation,59 it was also informed of contrary executive publications 0 and judicial decisions." While
duty will be imposed upon otherwise dutiable imports. Feller, supra note 25, at 33.
0 Since the case was framed for summary judgment, the dissent argued that the majority's
own reasoning would have compelled that the case be remanded to establish a factually
reviewable record. The majority, however, presumed that the record's silence regarding the
economic impact of Japan remitting its tax meant that the Secretary had already determined
that there would be no deleterious effect to American industry. 562 F.2d at 1225.
" The Treasury argued that Article IV (4) of Part II of GATT expressly prohibited contracting parties from levying countervailing duties against each other's products to offset export
bounties which take the form of indirect tax remissions or exemptions. But the Customs Court
dismissed that argument quoting American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050
(1973) that a law of Congress prevails over a trade agreement and that the United States
undertook Part II of the GATT which includes IV (4) to the fullest extent not inconsistent
with existing legislation. Protocol of ProvisionalApplication of the GATT, 61 Stat. A 2051
(1947).
However, had the Japanese tax been a direct tax, such as those levied upon income or
profits in contrast to an indirect tax such as an excise, sales, or turnover tax, it is conceivable
that the decision might have been different. See Malcom and Malgrem, NegotiatingNontariff
Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus., 327, 351 (1975) and King, Countervailing
Duties-An Old Remedy With New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW. 1179, 1185-86 (1969). But many
economists and the Treasury Department believe that there is no difference in effect between
the two taxes. See Statement of John R. Petty, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to the
Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, Canada, Nov.
20, 1968.
See notes 2, 13, and 49 supra.
5' See note 53 supra.
'7 562 F.2d at 1222-23.
The CCPA said, "An assumption that Congress had the quoted paragraph in mind, when
it acted in 1909, would not warrant the further assumption that it thereby ratified a holding
that excise tax remission alone is a bounty. . . .We shall never know whether he interpreted
Downs as merging remission and certificate elements of the Russian scheme or whether he
considered the saleable certificates alone an excessive remission." 562 F.2d at 1218.
-"On the issue of whether or not Congress was aware of Treasury's 80 year policy, the
dissent conceded that Congress was at least aware of it for 21 years. 562 F.2d at 1232. See
note 18, supra, for an appropriate response.
" UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES, 434 (1919).
See note 32 supra.
11 A review of the cited and researched cases established that the bounty or grant in each
case was measured by an excess over the remission of the excise tax. See notes 26-28,31, supra.
In Marion R. Gray v. United States, 70 TRms. DEC. 811, T.D. 48679 (1936), the Customs
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Congress in the 1950's"2 refused to enact legislation conforming section 303
to the Treasury's practice, the CCPA would not infer that "Congress would
harbor in its breast a disapproval of an administrative practice for 80 years
while remaining so supine or irresponsible as not to change it." 3 In addition, Congress in amending the pricing system 4 of the Antidumping Act 5
to conform to the countervailing duty statute in the Trade Act of 1974,
expressed "neither approval nor disapproval" of Treasury's practice." The
determinative test67 of legislative intent was the successive reenactment of
statutory language without substantial change since 1897,68 despite legislative cognizance of the Treasury's long-continued, uniform practice.
The dissent disagreed with the majority on all points. First, it believed
that the Treasury's determination of the economic result of the Japanese
Commodity Tax was not a factual inquiry, but rather a conclusion of law,
subject to appellate review. 9 Second, it interpreted Downs to hold that the
Court stated, "at least a part of the excess of Great Britain's drawback paid to the manufacturer constitutes a bounty or grant under section 303 of the Tariff Act." Id., at 813.
61 See Hearings on H. Res. 1535 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess., 2, 79 (1951) and Hearings on H. Res. 5505 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 115, 124-25 (1952).
1 430 F. Supp. at 254. Quoting Judge Newman, the dissent viewed congressional inaction
to mean that Congress was satisfied with the way that it had earlier written the statute and
with the way that the Supreme Court had so construed the law. 562 F.2d at 1232.
" The amendment to the Antidumping Act provided that in determining the "purchase
price" of imports the following shall be added to the importer's price:
(a) the amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation directly upon
the exported merchandise or components thereof, which have been rebated, or
which have not been collected, by reason of the exportation of the merchandise to
the United States...; and
(b) plus the amount of any taxes rebated or not collected, by reason of the
exportation of the merchandise to the United States, which rebate or noncollection
has been determined by the Secretary to be a bounty or grant within the meaning
of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930. (Emphasis added) P.L. 93-618, § 321(b), 88
Stat. 2045 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 162 (1970)).
19 U.S.C. § 203. "It should be kept in mind that the Countervailing Duty Law and the
Antidumping Statute are opposite sides of the same coin. The former deals with subsidized
imports entering this country; the latter deals with imports being sold at less than fair value
in this country," King, supra, note 54 at 1181.
" "However, your committee, in recommending this amendment does not express approval
or disapproval of the standard employed by the Treasury Department in administering the
countervailing duty law ....
" HousE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, H. REP. No. 571, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1973) and "However, the Committee in recommending this amendment
does not express approval or disapproval of that . . . Treasury practice." SENATE FINANCE
CoMmdlrrrzE S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7309. "The effect of the Committees' mutually contradictory...
statements did not disturb the status quo with respect to the administrative practice on
countervailing duties." 562 F.2d at 1221-22.
61 "A long continued administrative practice, if not contrary to or inconsistent with law is
entitled to great weight." 562 F.2d at 1219.
6 See notes 17-22 supra.
0 562 F.2d at 1223.
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single element of remission of a nonexcessive excise tax was sufficient to
constitute a "bounty or grant;" thus, in the instant case, Downs was binding precedent upon which the CCPA must rely."0 Third, it found that even
though the Treasury's administrative practice was long continued and
uniform, it must yield to a judicial interpretation whenever a conflict
occured.71 Finally, the dissent questioned congressional acquiescence in the
Treasury's administrative practice, especially in light of the 1974 Trade
Act's provision authorizing judicial review of the Treasury's determination
that a "bounty or grant" had not been conferred on foreign products."
Under section 303, the United States indicated its intention to protect
domestic industry from the threat of unfair foreign competition through
government subsidies. A tension exists, however, between the policy of
protecting American industry, which, if excessive, could provoke retaliation abroad, 3 and the policy of encouraging competition and free trade
among nations.
The 1974 Trade Act authorized American producers, manufacturers,
and wholesalers, for the first time,7" to seek judicial review of negative
countervailing duty determinations. Therefore, domestic industries threatened by international competition" could, in addition to requesting protective measures from Congress or the President, institute "self-help" by
filing a court action."'
70

562 F.2d at 1226-27.

562 F.2d at 1231.
7 562 F.2d at 1231-35.
'3 Nonetheless, since the Customs Court's decision in April, 1977 imposing countervailing
duties upon mere remission of foreign excise taxes, there has been widespread concern that
if the decision were upheld an international trade war would ensue. Rowe, Retaliatory Tax
by U.S. on Imports Ruled Unneeded, Wash. Post, July 29, 1977, at 1, col. 3. Not only Japan,
but most of the United State's European trading partners also impose a value added tax on
goods sold in the domestic market but remit the tax upon export. Farnsworth, TV Sets from
Japan Escape Special Tax, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1977, at 1, col. 4. In fact, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) specifically authorizes remission under those circumstances. The Japanese Government and the European Community had told the United
States to expect retaliatory action if the United States courts upheld plaintiffs complaint
on appeal. Penalty Tax Against Japanese Goods Rejected, Wall St. J., July 29, 1977, at 3,
col. 1.
7, See note 8 supra.
" One analysis of Zenith Radio Corporation's business problems concluded that it was not
so much foreign competition but mismanagement which prompted its troubles. In fact, this
analysis claims that even had Zenith prevailed or if other protectionist measures had been
instituted, those actions would only have slightly benefitted Zenith. Ingrassia, Home Grown
Woes, Zenith's Own Actions As Well As Imports Prompted Its Troubles, Wall St. J., Oct.
25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
11 In fact, that is exactly what United States Steel Corporation has done. United States
Steel recently filed suit in the Customs Court asking the court to declare that as a matter of
law when the European Community rebated its value added tax on steel exports to the United
States, it had conferred a bounty or grant equal to the amount of the Value Added Tax (more
than $2 billion), which must be countervailed. Rowe, supra note 73.
'
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But in resolving this conflict between protecting domestic industries and
encouraging international trade, the CCPA reaffirmed the Treasury's administrative practice that protection will only be afforded where a foreign
government subsidizes its domestic industries." For the immediate future
a mere remission of foreign excise taxes will not amount to a bounty or
grant sufficient to trigger the application of the countervailing duty law.',
Garry Seltzer
Robert Strauss, the President's Special Trade Representative, was quoted as saying that
he was very pleased with the decision. Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal feared
that had the decision gone to the contrary, the White House would have been forced to
attempt to defeat the decision with new legislation, a doubtful proposition in view of the mood
of the Congress. Id.
11Even so, in May 1977, Japan "voluntarily" agreed to limit its exports to 1,560,000
completed television sets and 190,000 partially completed sets. There has been general industrial approval for this agreement. Farnsworth, supra note 73.

